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THE CHECKERED CAREER OF PARENS PATRIAE:
THE STATE AS PARENT OR TYRANT?
George B. Curtis*
In this Article, Mr. Curtis discusses the development and use
of the parens patriae doctrine from its early English origins to
its modern American employment in cases involving juveniles,
mental incompetents, and the protection of interests held by the
general populace. He urges that the experience courts have
gained over the years be wisely utilized in any future expansion
of this doctrine, which has the potential to be either the cloak
of much needed state protection or the sword of state abuse.
INTRODUCTION
The term parens patriae has enjoyed or, better, endured a var-
ied history of both usage and interpretation. Historically, it has
referred to the king as father and protector of his people. While
American courts have accepted this aspect of the sovereign pre-
rogative and incorporated it into their decisional jurisprudence,
American case law has developed another aspect of the parens
patriae power, the state's action as "quasi-sovereign." This
theory permits the state to bring suit as a guardian of the well-
being of its general populace and economy. The vague parameters
of the parens patriae doctrine have accommodated this exercise
of state power. However, this same lack of firm conceptual
boundaries has been responsible for some abuses of state author-
ity. Consequently, under the aegis of parens patriae, actions
which may be sanctioned as parental in purpose are, in reality,
less wholesome in effect. This Article will consider some of the
past and current theories of the state as a protective guardian.
The concept of parens patriae has exhibited a remarkable stay-
ing power. Rebuked in one branch of the law, it makes its appear-
ance in another; even when circumscribed, it remains actively
viable within its new limits. Because it is uninhibited by a strict
conceptual or precedential definition, this theory imparts an ex-
* Former Russell Sage Resident in Law and Social Science, University of Chicago Law
School. B.A., Fordham University; M.A., Ph.D. (legal history) University of Virginia;
J.D., University of Chicago.
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tensive discretionary power to the court, agency, or government
which is able to justify its usage.
THE KING'S PREROGATIVE
The royal prerogative formed one of the central tenets of the
common law. Blackstone described the direct prerogatives as
"such positive, substantial parts of the royal character and au-
thority, as are rooted in and spring from the king's political
person . . . ."I By virtue of the Prerogative Regis, the king was
understood to be personally sovereign and to have pre-eminence
over all within the realm. Under this theory, the king could do
no wrong; he could never die; he was the representative of the
state in its dealings with foreign nations; he was part of the legis-
lature, the head of the army, the fountain of justice, always pres-
ent in all his courts, the fountain of honor, the arbiter of com-
merce, the head of the church.'
Parens patriae was an expression of the king's prerogative.' As
explained by Chitty:
The king is in legal contemplation the guardian of his people,
and in that amiable capacity is entitled (or rather it is his Maj-
esty's duty, in return for the allegiance paid him) to take care
of his subjects as are legally unable, on account of mental inca-
pacity, whether it proceed from first nonage [children]: second,
idiocy: or third, lunacy: to take proper care of themselves and
their property.'
Blackstone adds to the above duties the general superintend-
ence of all charitable uses in the kingdom, which the king exer-
cised through the keeper of his conscience, the chancellor.5
1. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *239-40.
2. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459 (3d ed. 1923).
3. Description of the king's prerogative first gained mention in 17 Edw. 2, cc. 1-16
(1324).
4. J. CHITrY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 155 (1820).
5. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *427. Supervision of charitable trusts as well as the
usages mentioned by Chitty, see text accompanying notes 3-5 supra, have all found ex-
pression in American adjudication. See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323
U.S. 594 (1944) (Supreme Court of New York empowered by statute to act as parens
patriae for state in caring for persons and estates of incompetents); Fontain v. Ravenel,
58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 393 (1854) (prerogative powers belong to states); Baptist Ass'n v.
Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1, 47-50 (1819) (disposition of all charitable donations
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Initially, parens patriae established the king as a protector or
supreme guardian of those classes threatened by forces beyond
their control.' This concept was brought into focus slightly by its
appearance in early cases concerning infants. As first stated in
Falkland v. Bertie:7
In this court there were several things that belonged to the King
as Pater patriae, and fell under the care and direction of this
court, as charities, infants, idiots, lunatics, &c., afterwards such
of them as were of profit and advantage to the King were re-
moved to the Court of Wards by Statute . .. .
Later, in the famous case of Eyre v. The Countess of
Shaftsbury, the Countess herself relied on this doctrine to keep
the infant Earl within her care:
[Tihe Crown, as parens patriae, was the supreme guardian and
superintendent over all infants; and since this was a trust, it was
consequently in the discretion of the Court, whether or no they
would do so hard a thing, as to take away an infant under
thirteen years of age, from so careful a mother as the Countess
was .... 10
However, the extension of royal protection to all the children
of the realm was an impossible task. In practice, the parens
patriae theory was applied in cases of wardships of the children
of the landed gentry-those children with estates profitable to the
rest with government of state); Mount Vernon Mortgage Corp. v. United States, 236 F.2d
724 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957) (recognizing United States action
as parens patriae by Attorney General).
6. See Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "Parens Patriae, "22 S.C.
L. REV. 147 (1970).
7. 2 Vern. 333, 23 Eng. Rep. 814 (Ch. 1696).
8. Id. at 343, 23 Eng. Rep. at 818. There is some doubt as to the authority for Lord
Somers' use of the term pater patriae. Only 2 Vernon's reports has him using that term;
other reports do not. This doubt is increased by the fact that William Peere Williams who
edited 2 Vernon's also reported Eyre v. Shaftsbury which referred to the king as pater
patriae. 2 P. Wms. 103, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722).
9. 2 P. Wms. 102, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722).
10. Id. at 104, 24 Eng. Rep. at 659. Through an interesting turn of both legal reasoning
and testamentary rights, Justice Eyre won the case while the Countess, with the Justice's
permission, retained custody. Her appeal to parens patriae received the approval both in
this case and in a later one which dealt with the subsequent activities of the young earl.
See 2 P. Wms. at 118, 24 Eng. Rep. at 664.
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realm and subject to the concupiscence of their relatives." Ward-
ship of his tenants' infant heirs assured the king income; sale of
the wardship could produce needed revenues. As can be seen in
Falkland v. Bertie, the profit motive was clearly at the forefront
of the king's decision to offer his protection. This application of
parens patriae to lucrative wardships served to narrow the ulti-
mate limits of the concept.
While the actual origins of the term parens patriae remain
unclear, 2 both commentators and judges have agreed that it was
founded in the Prerogative Regis and applied essentially to three
groups: children, mental incompetents, and charities. Practical
forces such as pecuniary interests served to focus the king's inter-
est on these three classes. Unlike its modern American counter-
part, the English common law forbade the sovereign or his
chancery court to intrude into distinctly political areas or to
claim jurisdicton over criminal matters. Although other areas of
the king's prerogative might justify such intrusions, parens
patriae was limited to a parental concern for dependent classes.
JUVENILE REFORM AND THE KING'S PREROGATIVE
In their headlong rush to embrace the doctrine of parens
patriae as the justification for the juvenile court movement, re-
formers both of the nineteenth, and twentieth centuries over-
looked two fundamental aspects of the chancery court's parens
patriae jurisdiction. They failed to perceive the economic inter-
ests which underlay much of the king's activity as public protec-
tor. More significantly, the reformers seemed to miss completely
11. The property nexus of the term was specifically alluded to by Lord Eldon in the
1827 case of Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort, 2 Russ 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 236 (Ch. 1827). While
he admitted that the court of chancery acting under the king's powers could consider all
cases involving infants, this was a physical impossibility, "because the Court could not
take on itself the maintenance of all the children in the kingdom." Id. at 21, 38 Eng. Rep.
at 243. Rather, the operative criterion was property:
With respect to the doctrine that this authority belongs to the King as parens
patriae, exercising a jurisdiction by this Court, it has been observed at the Bar,
that the Court has not exercised that jurisdiction unless there was property
belonging to the infant to be taken care of by this Court.
Id. at 20, 38 Eng. Rep. at 243.
12. See Lord Redesdale's statement in the case of Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort when
it appeared before the House of Lords under the title Wellesley v. Wellesley, 2 Bligh, N.S.
124, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078 (H.L. 1828).
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the subtle, yet crucial, fact that the doctrine embraced the
dependent and not the delinquent child.
English children who received royal protection had not violated
the norms of society; rather, they had summoned the care of the
realm because of their dependent and propertied status. The mo-
tivating reason to apply the parens patriae theory was the need
to support and to care for children, not to reform or rehabilitate
them. The chancery courts, in applying and developing the
theory, did not have to grapple with the problems of deviant
conduct. The theory was conceived to aid the child who stood as
a source of hope for the kingdom, not as a threat to its stability.
The early reformers either failed to notice or chose to ignore the
fundamental nature of the chancery court's theory and practice
under the concept of parens patriae. Instead, they saw its applica-
tion to the delinquent as "merely a logical extension of the princi-
ple of chancery and of guardianship applied in the court of chan-
cery."' The protests of the few reformers, who sensed the radical
transformation underlying this movement and who believed the
concept of parens patriae inadequate to support the concept of a
juvenile court, were ignored." The reform movement was de-
lighted to have a theory available which would treat the delin-
quent like a dependent child. The theory made it possible to
mask any element of societal fear of the child and to concentrate
on hopes of rehabilitation.
Such a wholesale disregard for the antinomies 5 latent in this
use of parens patriae had immediate results. The nineteenth cen-
tury witnessed some of the earliest recorded efforts in this country
to deal with the phenomenon of delinquency in a public, institu-
tional manner. The thinking of the early 1800's focused on an
13. H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1929) [hereinafter cited as
JUVENILE COURTS1.
14. See R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 135 (1923); E. WAITE, THE ORIGIN
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINNESOTA JUVENILE COURT 12 (1921); Lindsay, The Juvenile-
Court Movement from a Lawyer's Standpoint, 52 ANNALS 143-45 (1914); JUVENILE COURTS
5-6 (1929).
15. The term "antinomy" is Kantian in origin. It refers to a necessary and inevitable
conflict in the laws of reason, a paradox which must present itself as the ultimate resolu-
tion of each dialectical process. Here the term suggests an unrecognized, yet existing,
contradiction. See generally I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 249-334 (Meiklejohn
transl., Everyman's Library ed. 1934).
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awareness of childhood as a distinct phenomenon, a stage of
growth in human development deserving of the care and atten-
tion its pliant nature demanded. " At the same time, in the midst
of developing urban areas such as New York, Philadelphia, and
Boston, the negative aspects of juvenile behavior attracted public
concern. The juvenile delinquent stood in sharp contrast to the
celebrated innocence of childhood. Consequently, under the ban-
ner of parens patriae, reformers launched plans to save the delin-
quent, to relieve the circumstances of his development, and to set
him once more on the path of righteousness.
This path proved to be difficult to find and often was ob-
structed by the anxieties of the reformers themselves. These re-
formers were convinced that the juvenile delinquent was not sim-
ply an innocent gone wrong; he was also the social deviant threat-
ening public safety and order. Thus, the child was not only to be
delivered but also restrained from activities which were contrary
to the social norms of the reformers. As the managers of the New
York House of Refuge viewed their task in the early 1800's:
These little vagrants, whose degradations provoke and call down
upon them our indignation are yet but children who have gone
astray for want of that very care and vigilance we exercise to-
wards our own. They deserve our censure, and a regard for our
property, and the good of society, requires that they should be
stopped, reproved, and punished>
An emphasis on atonement and punishment was common to
the regimen of most houses of refuge or juvenile asylums. The
children were to be persuaded of the error of their ways and made
to suffer for them. Expiation, in the form of punishment, pro-
vided both the most convenient method of conversion and, it
16. The nineteenth century can well be described as the century of the child. Little Eva
and Pearl represented the child's entrance into the novel. Child nurture literature devel-
oped while advice to youth literature celebrated the idealism of youth and reflected the
connection between youth and the revivals. See, e.g., PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF
CHILDAHOOD (1962); Banner, Religion and Reform in the Early Republic: The Role of Youth,
23 THE AM. Q. 677, #5 (1971); Kett, Adolescence and Youth in Nineteenth Century
America, 2 JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY HISTORY 283, #2 (1971).
17. SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF PAUPERISM IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON THE
SUBJECT OF ERECTING A HOUSE OF REFUGE FOR VAGRANT AND DEPRAVED YOUNG PEOPLE,
reprinted in SOCIETY FOR THE REFORMATION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS, DOCUMENTS RELATIVE
TO THE HOUSE OF REFUGE 81 (1832).
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seems, a suitable form of justification for the reformers.'"
These contrasting themes of hope and fear found easy reconcili-
ation in a concept of parens patriae which had been detached
from its historical moorings. One of the earliest judicial endorse-
ments of this concept's role in the "reformation" of the deviant
child was articulated in Ex parte Crouse'" in which the father of
Mary Ann Crouse brought a habeas corpus action against the
Philadelphia House of Refuge. The child had been committed to
the House of Refuge by her mother who alleged, "that the said
infant by reason of vicious conduct, has rendered her control
beyond the power of the said complainant, and made it mani-
festly requisite that from regard to the moral and future welfare
of the said infant she should be placed under the guardianship of
the managers of the House of Refuge." ' " The court denied the
father's petition and endorsed the actions of the state and institu-
tion:
The object of the charity is reformation, by training its inmates
to industry; by imbuing their minds with principles of morality
and religion; by furnishing them with means to earn a living;
and, above all, by separating them from the corrupting influ-
ence of improper associates. To this end, may not the natural
parents, when unequal to the task of education, or unworthy of
it, be superseded by the parens patriae, or common guardian of
the community? It is to be remembered that the public has a
paramount interest in the virtue and knowledge of its members,
and that, of strict right, the business of education belongs to it.2 '
The concept of parens patriae, under the force of such judicial
reasoning, evolved from theory to doctrine.22 The state could in-
18. See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 4
1187 (1970).
19. 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1838).
20. id. at 10.
21. Id. at 11.
22. For examples of this evolution see In re Urbasek, 38 Ill.2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967)
(juveniles entitled to same standard of proof in criminal proceedings); Creighton v. Pope
Co., 320 II. App. 256, 50 N.E.2d 984 (1943) (duty of government to care for those of its
citizens who are unable to care for themselves); People v. Lyons, 374 11. 557, 30 N.E.2d
46 (1940) (support of paupers within the state police power); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 247 111.
328, 100 N.E. 892 (1913) (Juvenile Court Act upheld); County of McLean v. Humphreys,
104 I1. 378 (1882) (state may provide for care of indigent infants); Finlay v. Finlay, 240
N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925) (jurisdiction of state to regulate custody of its infants not
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vade the home, replace the parents, and take custody of the child.
However, the purpose of such action was not solely to foster the
well being of the child, but to protect the security and well being
of the state. Hopefully, the child would save the state as well as
the state the child.
Both reformers and courts imagined the child to be subject
totally to the influence of his environment. His mind was a blank
slate on which the parent and society could write the demands
of citizenship. This environmentalist psychology was an underly-
ing tenet in the conceptual framework of the parens patriae
theory as applied to juveniles. However, research at the turn of
the century showed that environmental psychology could not pro-
vide all the answers to the complex problems of juvenile delin-
quency.' :'
Despite certain theoretical inconsistencies, parens patriae has
evidenced remarkable staying power. It formed the basic ration-
ale for the operation of the juvenile court system and, to a limited
extent, still functions in that role today. Its popularity in juvenile
reform largely stems from its parental nexus in which the state
as parent is viewed as capable of achieving only good.
Roscoe Pound observed that "the powers of the [Star Ciham-
ber were a trifle in comparison to those of our juvenile courts.""
It took a direct confrontation in the Supreme Court to pierce the
veil of parental protection which had shielded juvenile court
proceedings from the requirements of constitutional due process.
In Kent v. United States25 and In re Gault" the Court focused on
dependent on domicile of parents). An example of this line of reasoning by the current
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court is to be found in the case of In re
Custody of a Minor, 250 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1957). This same theme may be found in the
case of Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965), the case which set the stage
for the famous opinion by Justice Fortas. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
23. See W. HEALY, MENTAL CONFLICTS AND MISCONDUCT (1917); Healy & Bronner,
Youthful Offenders: A Comparative Study of Two Groups, Each of 1000 Young
Recidivists, 23 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY §24 (1916); E. Ryerson, Between Justice and Compas-
sion: The Rise and Fall of the Juvenile Court 144-68 (1970) (unpublished doctoral disserta-
tion in the Yale University Library) for a discussion of the Freudian and behaviorist
theories which similarly undermined the environmentalism of parens patriae.
24. As quoted in YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY XXVii (1937).
See also MORRIS & HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 157
(1970).
25. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
26. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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the essential issue in any judicial proceeding-the liberty of the
individual. In the face of this consideration, the juvenile justice
system had failed miserably. As Mr. Justice Fortas stated in an
oft-quoted phrase, "[u]nder our Constitution, the condition of
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."27
Although the Court in the Kent and Gault decisions did not
eliminate the concept of parens patriae from American juris-
prudence, it did attempt to reconcile its operation with the de-
mands of due process. The work of reconciliation is by no means
complete. The ultimate scope of due process rights available in
juvenile court proceedings has not yet been determined. Issues
such as the right to a jury trial,"8 the right to receive Miranda
warnings," and the procedure of waiver hearings30 continue to
emphasize the conflict.
The conflict between due process and parens patriae has not
been limited to the juvenile courts. It has also reached into an-
other area of the king's prerogative, the protection and care of the
mentally ill. Perhaps the most innovative device developed by the
judiciary in attempting to restrain the wide ranging discretion
afforded by parens patriae is the right to treatment doctrine es-
tablished by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
and Fifth Circuits. The decisions in which this right to treatment
has been elaborated serve also to show the interchange between
the rights of juveniles and the status of the mentally ill.3'
In Nelson v. Heyne,31 the Seventh Circuit considered a class
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to
the programs of the Indiana boys school, a medium security
correctional institution for boys 12 to 18 years of age. The court
held that juveniles confined in this institution have a right to
27. Id. at 28.
28. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). But see DeBacker v.
Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 33 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Fowler, 476 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1973).
30. See, e.g., Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
31. The Kent Supreme Court opinion, as well as its remand at 401 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir.
1968), shows the interconnection between the areas of juvenile rights and the rights of the
mentally ill. Kent was found by the district court to be suffering from a serious mental
illness. Reviewing the remand case, the circuit court held the district court finding to be
sufficient to render waiver "inappropriate." Id. at 409.
32. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).
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rehabilitative treatment and found, further, that the system of
behavioral classification employed at the school did not provide
adequate rehabilitative treatment. Citing an earlier district court
case, Martarella v. Kelley,"' the court described a trend in recent
state and federal decisions grounded in a "concern-based on the
parens patriae doctrine underlying the juvenile justice sys-
tem-that rehabilitative treatment was not generally accorded in
the juvenile reform process . . . ."' thereby neatly praising and
condemning parens patriae as established by these recent opin-
ions in holding that juveniles have a constitutional right to treat-
ment.:"
The Martarella decision had established a quid pro quo rela-
tionship between the state's custody of children classified as Per-
sons in Need of Supervision (PINS) and its providing adequate
treatment for them:
[Hiowever benign the purposes for which members of plain-
tiff's class are held in custody, and whatever the sad necessities
which prompt their detention, they are held in penal condition.
Where the State, as parens patriae, imposes such detention, it
can meet the Constitution's requirement of due process and
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment if, and only if, it
furnishes adequate treatment to the detainee."
Nelson and Martarella then served as precedent for the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Donaldson v. O'Connor.7 In this case a for-
mer mental patient, who had been involuntarily restrained under
civil commitment procedures, sued his attending physicians and
others for deprivation of his constitutional right either to receive
treatment or be released from the state hospital. Judge Wisdom
found that the patient had a constitutional right to such treat-
:33. 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), enforced, 359 F. Supp. 478 (1973). Cf. M. v. M.,
71 Misc.2d 396, 336 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1972); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346
F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
34. 491 F.2d at 359.
:35. Id.
36. 349 F. Supp. at 585. The real difficulty, the district court pointed out, was that
while treatment is the quid pro quo for exercise of the state's rights as parens patriae, the
cases so holding offer little guidance as to standards for determining adequacy. Cf.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 578 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
37. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1975).
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ment as would help him towards a cure or improve his mental
condition. The court concluded:
[Plersons committed under what we have termed a parens
patriae ground for commitment must be given treatment lest
the involuntary commitment amount to an arbitrary exercise of
government power proscribed by the due process clause .3
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Stewart, speaking for
a unanimous court, limited his opinion to the issue of the state's
right to confine a non-dangerous individual who is capable of
surviving safely in freedom. The Court refused to consider the
Fifth Circuit's discussion of the right to treatment at this time,
vacated the judgment of the lower court, and remanded the case
for consideration of possible defenses to the action. 9 The Court's
refusal to discuss the right to treatment, however, does not lessen
the impact of this right on the parens patriae power of the state.
In the area of confinement of both the juvenile and the mental
patient, the right to treatment will continue to function as the
only logical elaboration of a quid pro quo responsibility placed on
the state for the exercise of its parental power.
Other courts have utilized this line of reasoning in considering
the procedural fairness of commitment hearings." The burden of
proof required in the proceeding furnished them with an oppor-
tunity to elaborate the quid pro quo theory, which has at its base
the balancing of interests between the individual's liberty and the
state's concern for the protection of both the individual and the
society as a whole."
This delicate balance struck between the interests of the indi-
38. 493 F.2d at 521. As in Nelson v. Heyne, the Fifth Circuit cited Gault as justification
for its quid pro quo theory. Id. at 524 n.33.
39. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Cf. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F.
Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
40. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard should be applied in commitment proceedings); Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633 (2d
Cir. 1971) (civil rights suit may be used to challenge constitutionality of competency
hearings); United States v. Maroney, 35a F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966) (party in commitment
proceedings has right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him).
41. The court in In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973), pointed out that parens
pa triae had not until recently encountered the concept of treatment as part of the required
care for the mentally ill: "It was not until the mid or late nineteenth century that therapy
took its place beside detention in the American model." Id. at 659. Cf. ROTHMAN, THE
DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971).
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vidual and the concerns of the state forms the goal of the more
recent parens patriae cases. It perhaps is illustrated best in the
case of Wisconsin v. Yoder" in which Amish respondents were
convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school- attendance
law by declining to send their children to public or private school
after they had graduated from the eighth grade.43 The Court re-
versed the convictions and, citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters" as
the "charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious up-
bringing of their children," held that the first amendment re-
quired a balancing between the interests of the state in the educa-
tion of its young and the parents' free exercise of their own reli-
gion.4" The Court noted, however, that the Pierce charter of rights
would not be the decisive factor if the child's health or safety were
jeopardized. In this manner the Court was able to distinguish
Yoder from Prince v. Massachusetts" which had formed the
mainstay of the state's prosecution.
The state's powers under parens patriae are not unlimited. The
Gault decision has initiated a critique long overdue in the area
of juvenile rights; first amendment issues and the constant recon-
siderations of the dictates of due process have resulted in a quid
pro quo formula which has put the doctrine of parens patriae on
the defensive. Increasingly, the proponents of parens patriae
must prove that its exercise accords with due process, and the
concept must today compete with other individual interests mer-
iting judicial attention which frequently will outweigh the paren-
tal concern of the state. 7
Unfortunately, the lessons of Gault and subsequent decisions
have not enjoyed universal application. In the area of parole
board jurisdiction, for instance, the courts have placed an
42. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
43. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed fathers entitled to hearing
on their fitness as parents before they can be deprived of custody of their children).
44. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
45. 406 U.S. at 209, 230-31. The Yoder Court held that parents' free exercise rights, and
not those of the children were at stake.
46. 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that the state had a wide range of powers to limit
parental authority in matters which could result in danger or injury to the child's welfare
and could, on that basis, validly enforce an absolute prohibition against certain religious
conduct).
47. See, e.g., Cinecom Theaters Midwest States, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d
1297 (7th Cir. 1973); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 366 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1966),
on the obscenity issue and state laws relating to it.
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unquestioning reliance on parens patriae which, in light of adju-
dication in other areas of the law, seems risky at best. In this
regard the decision of Hyser v. Reed4" well illustrates the unfet-
tered power of parens patriae:
[T]here is a genuine identity of interest if not purpose in the
prisoner's desire to be released and the Board's policy to grant
release as soon as possible. . . . Here we do not have pursuer
and quarry but a relationship partaking of parens patriae. In a
real sense the Parole Board in revoking parole occupies the role
of parent withdrawing a privilege from an errant child not as
punishment but for misuse of the privilege."
In a 1972 decision, the Supreme Court demanded that an in-
formal hearing be held in any parole revocation proceeding and
spelled out minimum requirements of due process. 0 The Court,
however, while limiting the absolute parens patriae discretion
awarded below, maintained a large amount of discretion in the
board on the ground that parole revocation is not a part of the
criminal prosecution and, therefore, does not require the full pan-
oply of procedural rights.' Significantly, no mention of Gault
appeared in the decision. Thus, the lessons of Gault and its expo-
sition of the tension between parens patriae and individual lib-
erty have not yet been appreciated fully.
THE QUASI-SOVEREIGN TENET OF Parens Patriae:
AN AMERICAN INNOVATION
In addition to an elaboration of the prerogative powers of
parens patriae, American courts have developed an interpreta-
tion and application of this concept which goes beyond and is
separate from the powers originating with the king's prerogative.
48. 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, Thompson v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
49. Id. at 237. See also Bearden v. South Carolina, 443 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.
granted, 405 U.S. 916 (1972), cert. dismissed, 405 U.S. 972 (1972); Menechino v. Oswald,
430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971); Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d
91 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1963); Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th
Cir. 1964).
50. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
51. For a full discussion of the theory of parole see Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal
Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 702 (1963). A similar attitude existed
toward draft board hearings. See Plotner v. Resor, 446 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1971).
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This development permits the state to act in a "quasi-sovereign"
capacity for the purpose of protecting the well-being of its entire
populace and its economy.52 As a quasi-sovereign, the state no
longer seeks to protect a dependent class; rather, its interest lies
in the protection of the entire patria.
This expansion of the traditional parens patriae concept devel-
oped through a series of cases involving the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to decide controversies between states or be-
tween a state and a citizen of another state.53 In deciding these
suits, the Supreme Court acts as an arbiter between quasi-
sovereign interests.54
In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 5 Justice Holmes de-
scribed the state's quasi-sovereign interests as being "indepen-
dent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and
air within its domain."5 In this case the Court enjoined
Tennessee manufacturing companies from discharging noxious
gas over Georgia's territory. 7 The Court's analysis in Tennessee
Copper followed that of an earlier decision, Missouri v. Illinois,5"
wherein the State of Missouri had been granted leave to file a bill
seeking to enjoin the discharge of sewage into the Mississippi
River. There the Court had observed that "if the health and
comfort of the inhabitants of a state are threatened, the state is
52. The state's proprietary interests exist apart from its parens patriae powers. See
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972). Some courts at times have not
achieved this separation. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. National Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 520
F.2d It (3d Cir. 1975). As to the need for the state to exhibit an interest of its own and
not merely seek redress for private interests, see California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d
774 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution
M.D.L. No. 31 v. Automatic Mfrs. Assoc., Inc., 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
53. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §2; 28 U.S.C. §§1251(b)(1)-(2) (1964).
54. As Charles Wright has noted, without this judicial mechanism the probable resolu-
tion of such disputes would involve lengthy diplomatic negotiations and perhaps force. C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §109, at 500 (2d ed. 1970).
55. 206 U.S. 230 (1970).
56. Id. at 237.
57. The common law action for abatement of a public nuisance often forms the basis
for a court's recognition of the state's quasi-sovereign standing. See, e.g., Ohio v. Wyan-
dotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 505 (1971) (dissenting opinion); In re Debs, 158 U.S.
564 (1895).
58. 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
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the proper party to represent and defend them. 's9 By the time
Missouri v. Illinois arose, the rationale behind the recognition of
a state's standing to sue under the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court already had been elaborated in the case of Kansas
v. Colorado'" in which Kansas sought an order to restrain the
diversion of water from the Arkansas River, an interstate stream.
The Court, in upholding the right of Kansas to maintain the suit,
stated:
It is not acting directly and solely for the benefit of any individ-
ual citizen to protect his riparian rights. Beyond its property
rights it has an interest as a state in this large tract of land
bordering on the Arkansas River. Its prosperity affects the gen-
eral welfare of the state. The controversy rises, therefore, above
a mere question of local private right and involves a matter of
state interest, and must be considered from that standpoint.'
Building upon these early cases, the Court, in time, was called
upon to expand the parental jurisdiction of the states to cases
concerning the protection of interests not cognizable under the
traditional limited concept of nuisance. Perhaps the most re-
markable exercise of the Court's original jurisdiction in this re-
gard occured in the case of Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.,62 in
which the state of Georgia sought leave to file in its quasi-
sovereign capacity to protect her people, as parens patriae,
against a continuing economic wrong. The wrong in this instance
was an alleged antitrust violation arising from a conspiracy
among the defendants to restrain trade and commerce among the
states. The Court granted leave to file and based its decision
solely on the parens patriae standing of the state to bring the
antitrust suit. The Court stated:
59. 180 U.S. at 241, See also New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1921).
60. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
61. Id. at 99. See also Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943); North Dakota v. Minne-
sota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
There are few problems with this usage insofar as it allows the state to protect the
interests of the entire state through injunctive relief. Th'is was the purpose of cases such
as Tennessee Copper and Missouri v. Illinois where the state instituted suit to protect
against pollution or Kansas v. Colorado where the state sought to prevent diversion of
the state's natural resources. In each of the above cases the state sought injunctive relief
and in so doing properly fulfilled its role as parens patriae.
62. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
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Georgia as representative of the public is complaining of a wrong
which, if proven, limits the opportunities of her people, shackles
her industries, retards her development, and relegates her to an
inferior economic position among her sister states. These are
matters of grave public concern in which Georgia has an interest
apart from that of particular individuals who may be affected.
Georgia's interest is not remote, it is immediate. If we denied
Georgia as parens patriae the right to invoke the original juris-
diction of the Court in a matter of that [sic] gravity, we would
whittle the concept of justiciability down to the stature of minor
or conventional controversies. There is no warrant for such a
restriction. "3
The Georgia case would serve as precedent years later in the
discussion of the propriety of awarding damages in parens patriae
antitrust suits."4 This question, however, was not presented to the
Georgia Court." Rather, the Court was anxious to answer the
charge that their decision ran counter to the holding in
Massachusetts v. Mellon"" where the Court refused to allow a
state, acting in its parens patriae capacity, to challenge a federal
statute. There the Court, in effect, held that the federal govern-
ment functioned as the ultimate parens patriae authority when
it exerted its legislative authority. "7 The Georgia Court distin-
guished Mellon on the ground that the present suit did not chal-
lenge a federal statute. " But Justice Douglas, on other occasions,
63. 324 U.S. at 451. Justice Douglas, during his tenure on the bench, showed a favorable
interest in the granting of standing due to quasi-sovereign interests. See Massachusetts
v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (dissenting opinion); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.
251, 266 (1972) (dissenting opinion); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493,
505 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
64. See text accompanying notes 73-82 infra.
65. Damages were denied in the Georgia case, but not due to the parens patriae nature
of the action. Rather, the' Court refused damages on the ground that the rates charged
had been approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). See Keogh v. Chicago
& N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
66. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
67. While the State, under some circumstances, may sue in that capacity for
the protection of its citizens (citations omitted), it is no part of its duty or power
to enforce their rights in respect of their relations with the Federal Government.
In that field it is the United States, and not the State, which represents them
as parens patriae, when such representation becomes appropriate; and to the
former and not to the latter, they must look for such protective measures as flow
from that status.
Id. at 485-86.
68. 324 U.S. 439, 446-47 (1945).
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has taken care to point out that the Mellon holding never estab-
lished a per se rule that any parens patriae challenge to a federal
statute is invalid." Moreover, recent cases have argued that the
Mellon decision should be construed narrowly so as not to preju-
dice the role of the state as protector of its citizens. 0 Neverthe-
less, it has been the states, rather than the federal government,
which in the course of American adjudication have shown the
stronger tendency to sue in the parens patriae capacity."
In recent years the Supreme Court has shown reluctance to
utilize its original jurisdiction in parens patriae suits, preferring
instead to channel the suits through the federal courts below."
This reluctance has not, however, removed the Court from discus-
sion which has recently embroiled the federal judiciary concern-
ing the question of damages in parens patriae antitrust suits. In
69. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (dissenting opinion). Douglas as-
serted that the Mellon opinion did not establish a per se rule to bar all suits against the
Federal Government as parens patriae. The language of Mellon supports his interpreta-
tion: "We need not go so far as to say that a State may never intervene by suit to protect
its citizens from any form of enforcement of unconstitutional acts of Congress .. " 262
U.S. 447, 485 (1923). Douglas cited South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) as
support. There a state sought to restrain the Attorney General from enforcing portions of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Court held that the state lacked standing to challenge
the statute under the due process clause of the fifth amendment or the bill of attainder
clause of article I, citing Massachusetts v. Mellon. But the Court did consider and reject
the state's claim that the statute violated the fifteenth amendment. For this proposition
it cited Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). The Court's failure to explain
why the state has standing to raise the fifteenth amendment claim but not the others is
troubling.
70. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); accord, Washington Util.
Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975). Contra, Arizona State Dept. of
Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 449 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1971); Public Util. Comm'n v. United
States, 356 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1966); State of Minnesota v. Benson, 274 F.2d 764 (D.C.
Cir. 1960). But see Government of Guam v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 329 F.2d 251 (D.C.
Cir. 1964), where the Benson decision was distinguished on very weak grounds.
71. But see In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); United States v. United Steelworkers, 271
F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1959). F.P.C. v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, ,362 U.S. 99 (1960), shows the
United States acting as parens patriae for the Indians in a particularly heavy-handed
manner. There the Court construed the relevant portions of the Federal Power Act to
invest the federal government with the power to vacate any disposition of Indian land by
the Indians without their consent. The federal government, as parens patriae, was to
"prevent unfair, improvident or improper disposition by Indians of lands owned or
possessed by them .... " In other words, the federal government was to save the Indians
from themselves. 362 U.S. 99, 119 (1960).
72. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971); United States v.
Nevada, 412 U.S. 534 (1973); Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California," the Supreme Court
held that section 4 of the Clayton Act74 does not authorize a state
to sue for treble damages for an injury to its economy allegedly
attributable to a violation of the antitrust laws. While the Court
recognized the state's standing to sue in its parens patriae capac-
ity as protector of the economy of the state,75 it distinguished
between the state's proprietary capacity, for which it would allow
the state standing to sue for treble damages under section 4, and
the state's parens patriae quasi-sovereign capacity, for which the
Court would allow injunctive relief but not damages. The Court
based its reading of section 4, in part, by analogy to 1.5 U.S.C. §
15(a), 75 the provision authorizing recovery in damages by the
United States and also limiting recovery to business or property
damages.77 Furthermore, the opinion focused attention on the
difficulty of assessing damages to a state's economy and the dan-
ger of duplicative recoveries. These two factors brought the ma-
jority to a method of fashioning federal remedies which Justice
Douglas described as "miserly."78
In refusing standing to sue for treble damages, the Hawaii
Court noted that such damage actions could be conducted better
through class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The state, presumably in its proprietary capacity
since its quasi-sovereign jurisdiction was deemed inadequate to
the task, could bring the class action as a proper representative
73. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970):
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found
or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee.
75. 405 U.S. at 258-59.
76. Section 15a states:
Whenever the United States is hereafter injured in its business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws it may sue therefor in the
United States district court for the district in which the defendant resides or is
found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall
recover actual damages by it sustained and the cost of suit.
For comparison with 15 U.S.C. § 15, see note 74 supra.
77. For a critique of this analysis see 18 VILL. L. REV. 79, 92 (1972).
78. 405 U.S. at 266.
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of the injured members of the class. Considerable academic re-
search has supported the Court's opinion. In light of the history
of quasi-sovereign standing under the parens patriae doctrine, the
Court's opinion seems well justified."
The state's argument in favor of treble damages in cases
brought by the state in its parens patriae capacity ignores the
development of the quasi-sovereign doctrine and confuses the
prerogative with the quasi-sovereign basis of parens patriae ac-
tions. Justice Holmes' dictum in Tennessee Copper that quasi-
sovereign interests are "independent of and behind the titles of
its citizens . . ." had gained recognition as the central premise
of the quasi-sovereign suit.8 0 In that capacity the state sues not
on behalf of its own proprietary interests which might be injured,
but on behalf of the entire state, as Holmes described it, "[Aill
the earth and air within its domain.""' The hallmark of the quasi-
sovereign suit has been the injunction to stop injury to the total-
ity of the state's commonwealth. Damages are not only unsuited
to this theory of state relief, they also defy measurement. No
common law precedent exists to support payment of damages
sustained by a particular group of persons to whatever body
chooses to sue. Those who would allow the state that power com-
mit the error of confusing the American precedent of quasi-
sovereign interests with the common law precedent of the sover-
eign's prerogative responsibility of caring for the dependent
classes of the realm. The result of this confusion amounts to what
two noted authors have described as a "Robin Hood" theory of
justice through which the state takes from the corporate
malefactors to give to the dependent consumer.2 While romantic
79. See Pfizer v. Judge Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 616-18 (8th Cir. 1975). The fourth count of
the complaint in the Georgia case sought damages on behalf of private parties-shippers
who had incurred overcharges resulting from the alleged conspiracy. The Court only ruled
on two other counts and did not award damages. See note 65 supra.
This discussion of standing does not by any means exhaust the parens patriae cases on
the topic. For instance, on the subject of standing and trusts, see Evans v. Abney, 396
U.S.'435, 457 (1970); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 597 (1945);
Mount Vernon Mortgage Co. v. United States, 236 F.2d 724, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957).
80. See note 54 supra. See also Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 451 (1945).
81. 206 U.S. at 237.
82. See Malina & Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Anti-
trust Laws, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 193 (1970).
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in concept, this theory is both legally and practically impossible
to achieve.
Nevertheless, like the concept of parens patriae, the theory of
a treble damages action, brought by the state in its quasi-
sovereign capacity, has exhibited a strong staying power. Legisla-
tion has been before Congress since early 1976 which would allow
the states' attorneys-general to sue for treble damages based upon
the states' quasi-sovereign authority. While the likelihood of pas-
sage of either the House or Senate versions appears slight, the
vague aura that surrounds the central concept of parens patriae
continues to sustain the adherents of the bills."3
CONCLUSION
The crisis of the Hawaii decision was inevitable. 'The breadth
of action encouraged under the king's prerogative was bound to
influence quasi-sovereign actions and to produce the resulting
confusion. It has taken more than seventy years to domesticate
parens patriae to the demands of due process in the area of
juvenile rights, and that contest continues. Ripped from its his-
torical context and applied to the delinquent as well as the depen-
dent, this concept has shown a tendency to inspire absolute dis-
cretionary power.
A similar danger exists in the area of quasi-sovereign interests.
The power of parens patriae tends to be expansive. This results,
in part, from the fact that the concept is not foreign to either our
heritage or our philosophy of government. We have seen the
king's role as protector of the weak and dependent classes under
his prerogative. The state has assumed this mantle.84 Unchecked,
83. At this writing, the Senate antitrust reform package, S. 1284, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976), of which the parens patriae bill is a part, was tied up in the Senate Judiciary
Committee with a filibuster threatened. The bill's co-sponsors, Senators Hart and Scott,
have agreed to amendments which would alter the parens patriae portion by not allowing
the state attorneys general to sue for damages to the "general economy" of the state as
measured by loss of tax revenues. Amendments would also limit such actions to violations
of § 1 of the Sherman Act, allow the court to set the amount of attorney fees to be awarded
plaintiff Attorneys, and assure that parens patriae provisions would not apply to civil
actions pending at the time the law was passed. 752 ATTR A-5. The House version of the
bill, H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), recently passed the House Rules Committee
and is now awaiting floor debate. 751 ATTR A-3.
84. See Fontaine v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 391-96 (1854) (Taney, C.J., concur-
ring); Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1, 47-50 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.);
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however, this power will lead to total intrusion by the state into
the personal lives of its members. The task of preserving the state
as a protective agent while acknowledging the rights of the indi-
vidual citizen dictates the establishment of a delicate balance
such as appeared in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 5 Hawaii now sounds this
call in the area of the quasi-sovereign potential of parens patriae.
Future judicial or legislative attempts to ameliorate the situation
will have to keep in mind the need for balance and the factors
involved.
Perhaps foremost in their considerations should be the fact that
parens patriae is essentially an absorptive doctrine. Just as it
easily accommodated the prejudices of the progressive reformers
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so will it
assimilate the obvious and latent prejudices of those who employ
it in their cause today. In view of such concerns as due process,
both substantive and procedural, employment of the concept
parens patriae as a central element in any reform campaign is too
dangerous, its potential costs too great, when the likelihood of
abusive discretionary power is the probable result. Closely super-
vised in a well-established procedural framework it may add to
any cause, just as it provides an alternative to the criminal justice
system in the juvenile court and just as it aided the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to arbitrate potentially explo-
sive disputes between the states. Even in those two areas, how-
ever, its expansive quality and the dangers it entails have been
felt. Employing the doctrine of parens patriae without the
cautions offered by its evolution, the state as parent could easily
become the state as tyrant.
R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 68 (1921); JUVENILE COURTS 5-8 (1929).
85. See notes 42-45 supra.
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